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Introduction 
Disruptive Innovation: a term that perfectly sums up the impact of social media 
on people’s everyday life. Crucial information can be produced and disseminated 
among millions of people in a flash, even information concerned with real-time 
updates on important events. Unfortunately, new technologies have not only rev- 
olutionised traditional sectors such as retail and advertising, but they have also 
been fertile and ground-breaking even on a much more slippery ground: misinformation, hoaxes, a d propaganda ( National Endowment for Democracy 2017). 
Disinformation, widely defined as “the purposeful dissemination of false information intended to mislead or har ” ( National Endowment for Democracy 2017 ), 
is probably as old as human relationships – in the 5th century B.C., the Chinese 
military theoretician Sun Tzu wrote that “all warfare is based on deception.” 1 
However, the advent and easiness of use of social media has served to enhance the 
scale (capability to reach billions of people), scope (capability to achieve a focussed 
objective, e.g. in terms of a particular audience group), and effectiveness of disinformation ( Bradshaw and Howard 2018 ). 
Moreover, the dis/information diffusion on social media is often supported 
by automated accounts, controlled totally or in part by computer algorithms, 
called bots. Designed to mimic human behaviour online, a dominant and worris me use of automated accounts is far from being benign: they have been often 
used to amplify narratives or drown out political dissent ( Yang et al. 2019 ). 
Recent studies demonstrate that bots are particularly active in spreading false 
information. Among other examples, Shao et al. (2018) report of a highly viral 
fabricated news story titled ‘Spirit cooking’, which claimed Clinton’s campaign 
chairman practiced bizarre occult rituals, and was published four days before 
the 2016 US election, subsequently shared in over 30,000 tweets. Even more 
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worryingly, the Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation 
reports that bot accounts are being used in 50 out of 70 investigated countries 
which make use of organised social media manipulation campaigns ( Bradshaw 
and Howard 2019 ). 
According to the 2019 report ‘Weapons of mass distraction’ ( Gangware and 
Nemr 2019 ), strategists of false news can exploit – at least – three significant targets 
of the online information ecosystem: (1) the medium: the platforms on which fake 
news creeps in and expands; (2) the message: what is the information that one 
wants to convey?; (3) the audience: who consumes (and contributes to diffuse) 
this information. The work presented in this chapter focussed on the three mention d aspects. Relying on two huge Twitter corpora about (1) migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea from North Africa to Italy, and (2) Covid-19-related discussions, the authors analyse the relevant (i.e. those not compatible with users’ r d  activity) communication and interaction patterns, spotting out the accounts 
that contribute to the effective dissemination of messages. 
Our main results are the following: first, after cleaning the system from the r ndo  activity of users, we detect the main hubs of the two networks, i.e. the most 
effective accounts in significantly propagating their messages, and we observe that 
those accounts have a higher number of bots among their followers than av ra . Second, for the migration topic, the strongest hubs in the network share a 
relatively high number of bots as followers, which most probably aim at further 
increasing the visibility of the hubs’ messages via following and retweeting. As far 
as the Covid-19 topic is concerned, at least at the time of our investigation, the 
presence of bots is more limited, but we expect it will grow when the issue stops 
being only medical and starts becoming political. 
To the best of our knowledge, the existence of formations of bots shared by 
a group of human-operated accounts has never been reported in the literature 
before. 
Datasets 
Our study is based on two large corpora of Twitter data, generated by collecting 
tweets in Italian concerned with migrations and Covid-19-related discussions. For 
data collection, we developed specific programmes which, by exploiting Twitter 
public filter API, 2 provided real-time tweet delivery and allowed the collection of 
sets of data filtered according to specified keywords. For both datasets, we selected 
a set of keywords compatible with recent chronicles. 
The keywords for the dataset about migration have been selected because they 
are commonly used in Italy when talking and writing about immigration flows 
from Northern Africa to the Italian coasts, including the dispute about the holder 
of jurisdiction for handling emergencies involving European countries and NGOs. 3 
We collected 1,082,029 tweets, posted by 127,275 unique account IDs over a 
period of one month (from 23 January to 22 February 2019). By relying on the 
bot detector classifier developed by Cresci et al. (2015) , all the accounts have been 
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classified either as human-operated or as bots. This classification led to 117,879 
genuine accounts and 9396 social bots, representing around 7% of all accounts. 
It may be worth pointing out that the period over which the data was collecte  was characterised by a lively political debate in Italy about the landing of 
the Diciotti ship, which was operated by NGOs and rescued migrants fleeing from 
North Africa to Italy. Rescuing almost 200 migrants on 16 August 2018, it initially 
received a veto to land from the Italian government; it was allowed to do so only 
after ten days. Mr. Matteo Salvini, at that time Minister of Internal Affairs, was 
afterwards investigated for kidnapping and abuse of office; the case was stopped on 
19 February 2019, when the Italian Senate did not grant judges the possibility to 
prosecute him. Right before and after the Senate’s decision, there was an intense 
debate on social networks about migrants and NGOs, and about the role of the 
Italian government and of the European Union (EU). 
The collected tweets concerned with Covid-19 had hashtags related to the 
coronavirus contagion in the text of the tweet. 4 We collected almost 2.5 million tweets in Italian, from 21 February 2020 to 10 March 2020. 5 By relying on 
Botometer, the bot detector/classifier developed at the Indiana University ( Varol 
et al. 2017 ), all the accounts have been classified either as human-operated or as 
bots. This classification led to 265,910 genuine accounts and 16,973 bots, representing 6% of all accounts. Also in this case, it is important o notice that the timing 
of the data collection is significant, as far as the topic and the Italian scenario are 
concerned. In fact, on 21 February the case of the so-called patient one in Lombar y broke out, giving rise to the escalation of the epidemic in Italy. 
Users’ affiliation 
Following previous studies ( Becatti et al. 2019 ; Caldarelli et al. 2020), we used the 
official certification of one account’s authenticity, provided by Twitter, in order 
to get the polarisation of users. Indeed, upon request from its owner, an account 
can be certified by the platform and tagged as verified once its authenticity is 
confirmed. On the official portal, the verified accounts display a blue circle with a 
white tick at the centre, close to their name. 
The intuition behind recent researches on Italian Twitter users’ polarisation 
( Becatti et al. 2019 ; Caldarelli et al. 2020) is that two verified users are perceived 
as similar if their messages are retweeted by the same (unverified) users. In order to 
translate this intuition into a measure, we consider the bipartite network formed 
by verified users (on one layer) and unverified users (on the other layer). A link is 
present in the network if one of the two users retweeted the other one at least one 
time, no matter if the unverified user retweeted the verified one or vice-versa. We 
chose to focus on retweets since they represent the preferred way through which 
users spread messages they agree with ( Conover et al. 2011 ). 
Figures 12.1 and 12.2 show, respectively, the communities of verified users 
found for the migration flows scenario and the Covid-19 one. In particular, the 
network in Figure 12.1 presents a strong community structure. The accounts tied 
FIGURE 12.1 The communities of verified users in the migration flows dataset 
to the Italian government – in office at the time of data collection (Lega and 
Movimento 5 Stelle) – and other right-wing parties are in blue. The accounts 
of the centre-left-wing parties (e.g. the Italian Democratic Party, PD) are in red. 
The violet group includes official media accounts, several NGOs, and left-wing 
politicians. Some official accounts related to the Catholic Church are in orange. 
In turquoise, we represent some smaller groups involved in the debate, such as the 
Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat and some of his ministers, and in green we 
represent a soccer commentators’ community. 
As can be seen, the communities are mostly based on their political inclinations. 
In fact, it is well known that Twitter users tend to be strongly clustered in communities sharing si ilar ideas ( Bessi et al. 2016 ; Del Vicario et al. 2016 ; Schmidt et al. 
2018 ). Figure 12.2 shows a pretty clear correlation with respect to political ideas. 
Orange represents the accounts of the Movimento 5 Stelle. Light blue (on the left) 
are accounts of Forza Italia. The red vertices are those of the Democratic Party, the 
institutional users (embassies, police, carabinieri, ministers, local governments) are 
FIGURE 12.2 The communities of verified users in the Covid-19 dataset 
represented by blue vertices. Purple vertices are related to Fratelli di Italia, Lega, 
and newspapers. Finally, the light green vertices on the right are related to TV 
pundits, journalists, actors, or theatres accounts, while the yellow community on 
the left is composed mainly by sport journals and journalists. 
Verified accounts of politicians can be easily associated with a political party; 
thus, ideological inclination of unverified users can be guessed by considering 
their interactions with the communities of verified ones. Figures 12.3 and 12.4 
show the matrix of online interactions between verified and unverified users. 
In Figure 12.3 , we report the matrix describing the interactions between v rifi d and unverified users for the migration flows dataset. Nodes are coloured 
according to their communities, i.e. violet for NGOs, media accounts, leftwing politicians, and for the Democratic Party community, orange for Catholic
Church-related accounts, and blue for the pro-government users. In grey, there 
are users with lower values of polarisation. Figure 12.4 describes the interactions 
between verified and unverified users for the Covid-19 dataset. Also in this case, 
FIGURE 12.3 Interactions between verified and unverified users for the migration flows 
dataset 
FIGURE 12.4 Interactions between verified and unverified users for the Covid-19 dataset 
the community structure clearly reproduces the cluster of verified users with similar political background. Even in a situation of crisis, people tend to follow advice 
from experts only from a particular side of the political parties ( Bessi et al. 2016 ; 
Del Vicario et al. 2016 ). A striking case is that of medical doctor Roberto Burioni, 
a physician with expertise in infectious diseases (Starr 2020), whose messages are 
retweeted only by the red community. 
Like in a previous study (Becatti at al. 2019), even for the two case studies the 
community structure is strong. 
Significant content exchange 
As anticipated in the Introduction, in the analysis of a complex information system, 
one of the main issues is to skim relevant information from ‘noise’ ( Cimini et al. 
2019 ). Of course, the definition of noise itself depends on the system. In the pr vious section, we obtained the political affiliation of verified users by projecting the 
information in the bipartite network describing the interactions between verified 
and unverified users. 
By applying the procedure proposed by van Lidth de Jeude et al. (2019) , we 
filter the total exchange of content in our datasets after discounting the information 
regarding the activity of users and the virality of messages. Following the approach 
of Becatti et al. (2019) and Caldarelli et al. (2020), we build the network of users 
and messages. A link from a user to a message is present if the user authored the 
message, while there is a link from the message to the user if the latter retweeted 
the message. This network of users and messages is then used to determine the 
connections between the users: for every (ordered) couple of users u and w, we 
consider how many times w retweeted a message authored by u, compared to 
the activity of u as an author, the retweeting activity of w, and the virality of the 
messages. 
At the end of the procedure, we obtain a ‘validated’ network: users in such a 
network contribute to spread the messages in a statistically significant way. The 
filtering procedure returns a directed network in which the arrows go from the 
authors to the retweeters. For the migration dataset, the number of nodes reduces 
to 14,883 users and the number of links reduces to 34,302. For the Covid-19 d ta et, the final network contains 10,412 different users and 14,105 links. 
Figures 12.5 and 12.6 show the structure of the validated networks in terms of 
communities for the two scenarios, respectively. The former figure describes the 
directed validated projection of the retweet activity network. Nodes are violet for 
NGOs, media accounts, and left-wing politicians, red for the Democratic Party 
community, and blue for the pro-government users; other colours identify smaller 
communities. An arrow between a source node and a target node is present if 
the target is a significant retweeter of the source. The dimension of each node is 
proportional to its hub score: the biggest node (in blue) is the account of Matteo 
Salvini, i.e. the leader of a major right-wing party and the Minister of Internal 
Affairs at the time of the data collection. The latter figure describes the directed 
FIGURE 12.5 Mediterranean flows 
FIGURE 12.6 Covid-19 
validated projection of the retweet activity network. In red, the Italian Democratic 
Party, in orange, accounts of politicians and journalists close to Movimento 5 Stelle. 
The violet cluster is divided into two poles: the one of media (in the centre) and 
the one of the extreme right parties (on the right). Interestingly, all communities 
are extremely linked to the core of the media. 
Results 
The effectiveness of a hub can be derived by its ability to reach a high number 
of relevant nodes: this principle is finely implemented in the Hubs-Authorities 
algorithm, originally introduced in Kleinberg (1999) to rate webpages. In the 
original version, the paradigm assigns two scores for each webpage: its authority, 
which estimates the value of the content of the page from the pages linking to 
it, and its hub value, which estimates the ability to redirect to the most relevant 
pages. In the scenario currently under investigation, hubs and authorities are 
Twitter accounts. In the following we will focus on hubs, because they represent 
the driving force of the discussion and are relatively popular users, and even if 
they are not verified by Twitter, we often have reliable information about their 
accounts. 
Migration flows scenario 
Among the top 20 nodes, in terms of hub scores, the first account is owned by 
Matteo Salvini, leader of the right-wing party Lega. The second and the third ones 
belong to two journalists of a news website supported by Casa Pound, a neo-fascist 
Italian party. The fourth is owned by Giorgia Meloni, leader of the right-wing 
party Fratelli d’Italia and former ally, during the 2018 Italian electoral campaign, of 
Lega. Salvini and Meloni have similar opinions on how to deal with migration in 
the Mediterranean. The fifth and sixth accounts belong, respectively, to a jour alist of Il Fatto Quotidiano (a newspaper close to M5S) and an unverified user with 
opinions in line with the ones of the two above mentioned politicians. Notably, 
the top nodes belong to the blue community. The first account with a different 
membership (TgLa7, a popular newscast by a private TV channel, whose account 
belongs to the purple community) ranks 176th in the hub score ranking. 
Remarkably, we observe a non-zero overlap among the bots in the lists of the 
validated followers of human-operated accounts. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first time that such a phenomenon is detected. In our opinion, the use of 
bot squads, retweeting the messages of two or more strong hubs, aims at increasing 
the visibility of their tweets. We have detected two main groups of such accounts, 
the other being composed by a maximum of two common bots. The first one 
includes 22 genuine accounts (nine of which are in the top 10 hubs), sharing 
22 bots. In this set, some users share a relatively high fraction of bots; there is one 
right-wing account that shares all its automated followers with both Meloni and 
Salvini (see Figure 12.7 ). 
Figure 12.7 The relative overlap matrix among the list of bots following the top 20 hubs. 
A matrix entry represents the percentage of shared bots between users i 
and j over the number of bots following node i. There are 12 accounts 
sharing a relatively high number of bots 
Figure 12.8 shows the first group of genuine accounts sharing bots and all their 
bot followers. The subgraph includes genuine accounts (in dark blue) and all the 
bots following them (in magenta). The dimension of the nodes is proportional to 
their hub score but normalised on the subgraph. The biggest node represents 
Salvini’s account. In the picture, there are 22 bots shared by 22 humans. Among the 
latter, nine accounts are among the top 10 hubs. The subgraph contains 172 nodes. 
Notably, the accounts belong almost exclusively to the blue, i.e., pro-government 
community. The genuine accounts sharing bots and all their bot followers belong 
almost exclusively to the blue community, thus we can notice that in this com unity there is a strong cooperation between bots and humans. The hub scores, represented by the dimensions of the nodes, are nearly homogeneous among the hubs. 
FIGURE 12.8 Subgraph of the largest group of users sharing bots 
The incidence of bots in the subgraph of Figure 12.8 is 87%. The number of shared 
bots over the total number of genuine users is exactly 1. Interestingly, the hubs rarely 
retweet between each other in a significant way (in fact, only three links can be 
found among them). They leave it to the bots to spread the content of their partners. 
The topmost panel of Figure 12.9 shows that the main activity of the bots in 
the largest bot squad is retweeting. As expected, they mostly retweet human- 
operated accounts connected to them (see the central panel of Figure 12.9 ). The 
same cannot be said for mentions that may be used either to provoke or to involve 
the target in a discussion. Accounts from different political sides are mentioned 
by bot squads; in fact, the bot accounts with more than 30 mentions point to 
members of the blue community as well as to the official account of the Italian 
Democratic Party (pdnetwork), a centre-left party. It is worth noticing that other 
‘non-partisan’ verified accounts, e.g. the one of the President of the Republic 
(Quirinale) and the one of the President of the Chamber of the Deputies, are 
mentioned there and that, in most cases, the messages containing those mentions 
are sort of invites for the institutional figures to intervene in the management of 
migration flows (bottom panel, Figure 12.9 ). The most striking outcome of the 
analysis, however, concerns the sources cited by the bots in the blue squads: 89% 
of their original tweets (i.e. not replies, nor retweets or quoted tweets), contain a 
URL, and 97% of those URLs refers to www.voxnews.info , a website blacklisted 
as a source of political disinformation by two popular fact-checking websites, 
namely www.butac.it and www.bufale.net . 
Figure 12.9 Statistics of the largest bot squad 
Covid-19 scenario 
The top 20 hubs are mostly unverified accounts, all from the right wing and the 
extreme right wing of the political spectrum (exactly as in the above scenario). 
Among the verified accounts, we have Matteo Salvini, Giorgia Meloni, two right- 
wing journalists, Salvini’s political party, and a politician from the same party; all 
of them belong to the purple community. In the first position we have an u v rified user that we did not spot in the previous analysis, with hub score = 1: this is 
an unverified account that can be put in relation with extreme right-wing parties. 
Interestingly enough, in the top 10 hubs, we found four accounts already present 
Figure 12.10 The retweeting activity of genuine and automated accounts 
in the previous study on migration flows. Salvini and Meloni are respectively in the 
third and fifth places. It should be noticed that the distribution of the hub scores is 
very peaked (the second place in the ranking accounts for a hub score of 0.45, and 
it drops down to less than 0.10 for the 10th place). 
The activity of bots consists mostly of retweeting human users, although there 
is a non-negligible activity of genuine accounts in retweeting automated ones 
(see Figure 12.10 ). Figure 12.10 shows the retweeting activity of genuine users 
in the top panel, while the bottom panel reports the the retweeting activity for 
bots. As it can be seen, the trend of the retweeting activity of automated accounts 
closely follows the one of genuine users. Looking at the scales, the interaction 
between human users and bots is limited. Furthermore, the number of genuine 
users retweeting bots is even smaller. 
Amongst these bots, 300 also appeared in the analysis of the political discussion 
about migration flows. Only 1.7% of all detected bots passed the filtering procedure, thereby representing about 2.8% of validated accounts. Differently from the 
previous analysis, no bot is shared by the first 500 hubs in the network. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, using Twitter as a benchmark, we have analysed the flow of 
information within and between members of different communities, studying 
the dynamics of their interactions and the role of automated accounts in such 
exchanges. For our study, we have relied on techniques developed by physicists 
and computer scientists. In particular, we have filtered the network of connections and focussed on the most effective accounts in tweets propagation by taking 
advantage of statistical physics techniques, and we have used machine learning 
techniques to single out the automatic accounts operating on the network. We 
have demonstrated the impact of our approach by considering the propagation of 
Italian tweets concerned with two topics: migration flows in the Mediterranean 
and Covid-19 related discussion. The analysis has shown that bots play a central 
role in the exchange of significant content, and that the so-called hub nodes (the 
most effective accounts in propagating messages) have, among their followers, a 
high number of bots. This is particularly evident for the migration flows discussion. 
In the Covid-19 discussion, at least at the time of our investigation, the presence 
of bots is more limited, but we expect it will grow when the issue stops being only 
medical and starts becoming political. 
The conclusions we can now draw from our analysis do indeed depend on the 
specific topic of the discussion. As expected, the debate on migrants is dominated 
by the interplay of several communities strongly related to political parties and alli ce  operating in the Italian political arena. In this scenario, a rather clear structure 
of bot squads is present and its effect on the debate is evident. The total presence of 
bots represents 7% of all users, while their contribution to the backbone of content 
exchange reduces to the 2.5% of all validated users. 
For the Covid-19 discussion, a preliminary analysis showed the presence of 
echo chambers too. Interestingly enough, those chambers are related to political 
opinions, even if the subject is mostly scientific. This is not completely unexpected. 
Indeed, the political countermeasures in order to face the Covid-19 contagion 
strongly influenced the public debate; by converse, the already present political 
echo chambers still shape the activity of users on Twitter. The total presence of 
bots represents 6% of all users, while their contribution to the backbone of content 
exchange reduces them to 2.8% of all validated users. In contrast to the migration 
case, we find no signs of a coherent squad of automated accounts acting in the 
discussion. 
Notes 
1 Geoff Nunberg (2019) ‘ “Disinformation” is the word of the year – and a sign of what’s to 
come’, NPR, 30 December 2019. 
2 https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/api-reference/post-sta 
tuses-filter.html . 
3 We searched for the Italian translation of the following keywords: immigrants, migrants, 
ngo, boat drivers as human smugglers, seawatch, barges, illegal immigrants, Libyan coast 
guard, shipwreck, disembarkation. 
4 #coronavirus, #WuhanCoronavirus, #CoronavirusOutbreak, #coronaviruschina, #corona- 
viruswuhan, #ChinaCoronaVirus, #nCoV, #coronaviruses, #ChinaWuHan, #nCoV2020, 
#nCov2019, coronavirus, coronaviruses, ncov, ncov2020, ncov2019, covid2019, covid-19, 
SARS-CoV2, #SARS_CoV2, #SARSCoV2, #COVID19. 
5 We had an interruption of one day and four hours on 27 February due to connection 
breakdown. 
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